From the National Weather Service:

TODAY...MOSTLY CLOUDY EARLY IN THE MORNING THEN BECOMING MOSTLY SUNNY. PATCHY FOG EARLY IN THE MORNING. HIGHS AROUND 40. LIGHT WINDS BECOMING NORTHEAST 5 TO 10 MPH IN THE MORNING...THEN SHIFTING WEST IN THE AFTERNOON.

TONIGHT...PARTLY CLOUDY. LOWS 20 TO 28...COLDEST IN WIND SHELTERED AREAS. NORTHEAST WIND INCREASING TO 10 TO 20 MPH LATE...STRONGEST NEAR DOWNTOWN JUNEAU AND DOUGLAS.

FRIDAY...INCREASING CLOUDS. HIGHS AROUND 37. NORTH WIND 10 TO 20 MPH. HIGHEST WINDS NEAR DOWNTOWN JUNEAU AND DOUGLAS.

Over the next 24 hours temperatures are expected to rise significantly at sea level, and may breach the freezing point at elevation, especially on sunny aspects. Winds will be light through the day. Partly cloudy skies will give us a chilly night as the winds pick up overnight.

Yesterday temperatures spiked briefly above freezing up high, but otherwise remained cool. Winds were below 10kts, and there was little new precipitation.

Forecasted rising temperatures and sunshine will affect the snow, releasing small sloughs. Wind slabs are still sensitive in some places; at least one small-medium slab released yesterday on a ski cut. Fieldwork yesterday showed that these are generally strengthening with time. There may be some northeasterly wind transport this evening, building fresh wind slab.

Today the urban zone forecast is MODERATE. Small avalanches in specific locations, or large avalanches in specific locations. Warm temperatures and light winds have given the snow time to adjust to our last storm. Sunny aspects will see significant warming. Our persistent weak layer may still be a problem some places, but is unlikely to trigger, but will require a significant trigger to release a slide. This hazard rating is not reflective of backcountry conditions.

Hazardous conditions still exist in the backcountry. Our persistent weak layer is still alive and well out there. Recent fieldwork showed it is increasing in weakness and is becoming more difficult to trigger artificially. It is about 1m deep in the snow now. Generally existing at elevations above 2400', the sporadic unpredictable distribution and increasing snow load has increased the consequences and decreased our ability to detect it easily. Avoid thin spots that may trigger a much larger slide. It is possible that a small release may also trigger a deeper slide. Use safe travel techniques, gather information along the way, choose your lines conservatively and with intention.

The Human Factor, Pt. 1:

Here is an excerpt taken from a great avalanche article series hosted by the MEC website. This one is written by Ian McCammon, who has studied the human role in avalanches extensively. It will be posted half today and half tomorrow. Here it is:

In this article, we'll look at psychological factors that play a role [in avalanche accidents]. Even when people have extensive training and experience in avalanche terrain, human factors can blind them to dangerous conditions. We'll look at the most common human factors, where they come from, and how to minimize their hazards.

\"WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?\"
In hindsight, in the comfort of a classroom or bar, it's usually easy to see why an avalanche accident occurred. Perhaps the party chose to ski or ride a dangerously wind-loaded slope, enter a terrain trap during high avalanche danger, or continue climbing despite signs of recent avalanching. Working backward from a tragic outcome, the danger seems obvious to us and we wonder why anyone would take chances in such conditions. The easy answer is that the party must have been incompetent, arrogant, or just plain foolish. These answers help us feel better about ourselves since, after all, we wouldn't act like that. But they don't lead us to a better understanding of how we might be fooled into making the same mistakes.

To really understand human factors, we need to go back in the accident timeline. We need to imagine ourselves standing at the top of the slope, trying to decide if it is safe to ski or ride. Perhaps we've seen the signs of danger, but we also know that we have skied the slope many times before without incident. Or perhaps we know that another party is powering up behind us intent on skiing the same slope. Or perhaps we've waited all year for this vacation so we could highmark slopes just like this one.

Such knowledge tends to blur our judgment and tempt us into believing that it's OK to take a chance on this slope today. These influences operate in the shadowy edges of our subconscious, and we are often oblivious to their effects on our behaviour.

Fortunately, there are predictable patterns in how these unconscious influences affect our decisions. It turns out that these same patterns appear whenever we face physical hazards such as driving, unsafe sex, taking drugs and, yes, dealing with avalanches. These patterns are well known in areas such as advertising and health psychology, but their lessons apply to decision making in avalanche terrain as well.

WHAT ARE COMMON HUMAN FACTORS?
In a recent analysis of avalanche accidents in the United States, consistent patterns emerged in the decision making of avalanche victims. Here are six of the most common:

FAMILIARITY
Parties traveling in familiar terrain made significantly riskier decisions than parties traveling in unfamiliar terrain. This effect was especially pronounced for parties with substantial experience and training.

ACCEPTANCE
Accident parties that included females made riskier decisions than parties of all males. The effect was most pronounced in parties with little avalanche training. It is notable that these were precisely the parties in which women were least likely to participate.

CONSISTENCY
Parties that were highly committed to a goal ? a summit, ski slope or an objective in deteriorating weather ? made riskier decisions than parties just out for a day of skiing, climbing or sledding. This effect was most pronounced in parties of four or more.

EXPERTS
Accident parties often contained a de facto leader ? someone who was more experienced, older, or who had better skills. Remarkably, when this leader had poor avalanche skills, novice groups were more likely to follow their leader into dangerous situations than when novice groups made decisions by consensus.

TRACKS/SCARCITY
Parties took more risks when they were racing a closing window of opportunity, such as competing with another group for first tracks.

SOCIAL FACILITATION
When skilled parties met other people in the backcountry, they were more likely to take risks than parties that were less skilled. This effect, known as social facilitation, was most pronounced in groups with the highest levels of training.

These results are preliminary, but they mirror patterns that have been observed in other areas of risk taking and human behavior. It appears that when certain psychological cues are present, people find it difficult to heed more objective cues about avalanche hazard. The important lesson here is that these psychological cues have very little to do with avalanche conditions and a lot to do with our unconscious assumptions, biases, and habits.

Read the whole article here: http://www.mec.ca/AST/ContentPrimary/Learn/Snowsports/AvalancheSafety/HumanFactors.jsp

Other good Human Factor references:

http://www.summitpost.org/human-factors-in-avalanche-incidents/188636
PDF: http://arc.lib.montana.edu/snow-science/objects/issw-2009-0644-0648.pdf