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Risk Engineering Services

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December 18, 2024

Ms. Patty Wahto, Airport Manager
Juneau International Airport (JNU)
City & Burrough of Juneau
1873 Shell Simmons Drive
Juneau, AK 99801
Patty.Wahto@jnuairport.com

Purpose:	**AIRPORT LIABILITY RISK ENGINEERING SURVEY**
Client:	**City and Borough of Juneau**
Location:	**Juneau International Airport (JNU)**
Dates of Survey:	**September 25-26, 2024**
Policy Number:	**AAP N14308118 (7/1/2023-7/1/2025)**
Broker:	**Alliant Insurance Services, Inc.**

Dear Ms. Wahto:

This letter is to summarize and confirm the onsite risk engineering survey at the Juneau International Airport on the dates of September 25th through 26th, in our continuing support of your airport risk management efforts and for underwriting purposes.

The meeting was highly collaborative and please thank all of the member of the airport team for their efforts during our meetings and tours. It is clear that airport staff is committed to reducing the risk of losses in their daily efforts.

Personnel Interviewed:
In addition to you, the following individuals provided valuable information and assistance during this survey:
- Mr. Paul Khera, Deputy Airport & Security Manager
- Mr. Andres Delgado, Airport Maintenance and Operations Superintendent
- Mr. Robert Dilg, Terminal Maintenance Supervisor
- Ms. Angelica Lopez-Campos, Airport Business Manager
- Mr. John Miksell, Wildlife Biologist, USDA
- Ms. Chelsea Swick, Risk Management Officer, City & Borough of Juneau (CBJ)
- Ms. Jackie Woolman-Morgan, Risk Management Technician, CBJ
- Mr. Daniel Blount, Safety Officer, CBJ
- Ms. Pam Chapin, Airport Administrative Assistant
- Mr. Brandon Bagwell, ARFF Program Manager, Capital City Fire & Rescue (CCFR)
- Mr. Jason Tarver, Capital City Fire & Rescue

Survey Agenda:
<u>September 25th</u>:
- An initial meeting was held with the airport management team, CBJ Risk Management, and the USDA Wildlife Biologist for updates to operations, discuss status of prior recommendations, and plan the sequence of meetings for the two days of tours of the airport facilities.
- Tours of the airfield were conducted with Mr. Delgado, Ms. Woolman-Morgan, and Mr. Blount. This included the tours of runways and taxiways, FBO/fueling operations, maintenance shop, snow removal equipment building, and the airfield lighting electrical vault.

- A nighttime runway inspection tour was conducted with Mr. Delgado.
- A tour of the terminal was provided by Mr. Dilg.
- Daytime and nighttime inspections of the landside areas was conducted independently between other escorted tours.

September 26th:

- Airport risk transfer practices were discussed with Ms. Lopez-Campos.
- Tour of the ARFF station was conducted with Mr. Delgado.
- Quarterly fuel inspection reports were reviewed with Mr. Tarver while at the ARFF station.
- A tour of the terminal ramp was conducted with Mr. Delgado.
- A follow-up tour of the fuel farm and float pond mobile fuelers was conducted with Mr. Bagwell and Mr. Delgado to discuss some of the observations noted to loop Mr. Bagwell into some potential ARFF enforcement needs.
- A review and wrap up meeting was held with the airport management team.

Areas of Discussion/Documents Reviewed:

We reviewed a number of airport operational areas with a focus on potential airport liability risks. We also discussed the controls in place or needed to help reduce the potential for airport liability accidents and claims in these areas. Some of our discussions included the following areas:

- Airport organization and management.
- Airport operations and activities.
- Airfield upgrades completed or planned.
- Airfield self-inspections and maintenance.
- Tenant lease agreements & certificates of insurance.
- Airport security activities.
- Accidents/claims.
- The latest FAA annual inspection report.
- Airport Certification Manual (ACM).
- Airfield self-inspection reports.
- Fuel farm/vehicle inspection reports.
- Wildlife activity data.

Recommendations:

As a result of this survey, several new opportunities for improvement were identified. Our recommendations are listed at the end of this letter.

Future Risk Engineering Services:

Chubb Risk Engineering Services (CRES) can be called upon, if requested, to provide future consultative services in several ways such as Safety Management Systems for airports, tenant safety evaluations, slip resistance testing and accident/incident investigation training which are just a few of our capabilities. CRES employs consultants specializing in slip and fall prevention, industrial hygiene, ergonomics, driver safety, workers' compensation, and general liability. Each of these subjects may be of interest to assist airports with practices and procedures.

I look forward to my next visit at which time I will follow up on changes at the airport and the status of the attached recommendations. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at the numbers and email address above or Ms. Ginga Griffin at ginga.griffin@chubb.com or at 770.518.9210.

Sincerely,

James D. Dubois

Reviewed by,

Ginga Griffin

James D. Dubois CSP, CPCU, ARM
Senior Property & Casualty Risk Engineer
Chubb Risk Engineering Services

Ginga Griffin CPCU, ALCM
Program Manager/Principal Consultant, Aviation
Chubb Risk Engineering Services

cc: Ms. Vicki Holaday, Alliant Insurance Services, Inc., (vholaday@alliant.com)

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Risk Engineering Services

Airport Liability Risk Engineering Survey

JUNEAU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (JNU)

Juneau, AK

Prepared by:
James D. Dubois CSP, CPCU, ARM
Senior Property & Casualty Risk Engineer
Chubb Risk Engineering Services

***Dates of Survey*:**
September 25-26, 2024

AIRPORT LIABILITY RISK ENGINEERING
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

OBJECTIVES

The goals and objectives of this survey were to update underwriting information and provide risk engineering assistance to the airport organization aimed at preventing accidents and controlling costs in the event aviation liability accidents occur. The focus of the risk engineering survey was targeted at an assessment of existing management controls for the many areas that affect airport liability. The assessment addressed the risks associated with specific operations and activities and the controls in effect for the risks.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

As a result of the survey and observations made, it was determined that the airport performs many activities to control airport liability exposures and potential accidents/claims that might arise from complex airport operations.

It is not the intent of this report to summarize all of the many observations made during the survey; however, significant best practices were noted and discussed during the meetings. In addition, management improvement opportunities were identified during this evaluation and are presented at the end of this report as risk engineering recommendations.

LOSS EXPERIENCE

In a review of the loss history, there have been no new claims reported since our meeting last year.

Airport Security continues to be notified of all incidents. Incident reports are input into the CBJ Risk Management Department electronic filing system by either Mr. Khera, Ms. Chapin, or the Airport Terminal Manager. If injuries are thought to be involved, 9-1-1 is contacted so that municipal law enforcement and/or EMS personnel are dispatched. Cameras continue to be in place in many areas of the terminal. If an accident is captured on closed circuit cameras, the video recording is quickly retained in the security file before it is erased.

AIRPORT CHANGES, IMPROVEMENTS AND FUTURE PLANS

The following is a list of changes at the airport since our last visit:

- The short term, long term, and employee parking lots were completely reconfigured and re-paved.
- The Alaska Seaplanes terminal expansion project was completed that included relocating a fuel tank from one area of the ramp to the rear of the new building.
- A Remain Overnight (RON) pad was constructed.
- A ramp rehab project was completed.
- Jetbridge #5 was replaced.
- New conveyor lines were installed on the TSA baggage scanning equipment.



Recently completed improvements

The new Jetbridge #5



New RON pad

Ramp rehab nearly complete, north end as viewed from the roof of the terminal

Ramp rehab middle area, as viewed from the roof of the terminal

Ramp rehab south area, as viewed from the roof of the terminal

Future plans discussed include:

- A new ARFF crash truck has been ordered with delivery expected in 2025.
- Portions of the north end of Runway 8/26 shoulder and safety area will be re-graded for improved drainage.
- Preliminary plans are under discussion to replace older snow removal equipment.

GENERAL AIRPORT DATA

The airport continues operate one commercial runway, Runway 8/26 and one float pond runway, Runway 8W/26W. The Airport Diagram data has been updated and is accurate for movement area geometry. The airport current headcount is 30 employees with 10 in operations/maintenance, 7 in terminal maintenance/custodial, and 13 in management/administration.



Airport diagram

AIRSIDE ACTIVITIES AND CONTROLS

Airport Operations

There have been no significant changes to the airport programs and practices since the onsite survey in September 2023.

The Airport Certification Manual (ACM) was reviewed and found to be up to date. The revision log was most recently updated on May 28, 2024, with FAA approved modifications to several sections of the ACM.

Safety Management Systems (SMS)

The airport has made significant progress on the Implementation Plan (IP) and will be submitted to the FAA within the next six months.

Runway Safety Action Team (RSAT)

The RSAT is organized and hosted by the Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) manager. An RSAT meeting was held just prior to this survey, but he most recent written meeting summary available was the meeting held on September 19, 2023.

There were four events reported during this meeting, including three surface incidents and one runway excursion.

Runway Incursions

Two runway incursions involved aircraft improperly following instructions from ATCT while taxiing for eventual takeoff with no incidents.

Another reported runway incursion involved airport snow removal equipment (SRE). An airport skid steer operator had received clearance from ATCT for snow removal work on Taxiway D. An approaching small GA aircraft was cleared by ATCT to land on Runway 8, which they did safely with no interaction with the airport equipment. There was confusion in the tower immediately following the landing where they questioned if the SRE was on the Runway or Taxiway. The airport equipment had remained on the Taxiway as authorized and never entered the Runway. It is the airport's position that there was no wrongdoing by the SRE operator.

Surface Incidents

There was one surface incident involving an airport vehicle driven by the former Airport Deputy Manager. The driver failed to stop at the Taxiway H1 hold bar at Taxiway A. It was reported that he drove 4-5 feet, stopped, backed up, and then properly requested ATC clearance. There were no active aircraft in the vicinity.

Runway Excursion

None.

Airfield Maintenance

Runway safety areas are maintained by airport staff, including mowing of surface vegetation. There continues to be a full complement of equipment for airport facilities maintenance. The airport owns three dump trucks, a vacuum sweeper, a bobcat, a power roller, two tractors used for vegetation mowing, portable lighting and a generator.

The airport operations/maintenance staff continues to perform the Part 139 daily daylight and nighttime airfield inspections.

The snow removal and maintenance equipment building.

Painting of the airfield markings is contracted to an outside firm and conducted each year. The re-painting of movement area markings was completed in June 2024. During both our daylight and after-dark airfield tours, the surface markings on movement areas were observed to be visible. There is some build-up of rubber on the runway centerline, but normal winter SRE operations will remove some of the rubber. Otherwise, the signage and edge lighting were observed to be highly visible and in good repair.

Runway 8 designator and in-pavement center line lighting

Runway 8 centerline has some rubber build-up



Taxiway B surface painted hold position markings and enhanced taxiway markings



Runway 26 designator and in-pavement center line lighting

Taxiway G surface painted hold position markings and enhanced taxiway markings

Airfield signs were highly visible and in good repair

Wind indicator and segmented circle

Movement area markings in good condition

Fuel Farm, Airfield Fuel Tanks, and Mobile Fuel Trucks

The primary airport fueling FBO continues to be Aero Services. There are several other entities on the airport that dispense fuel and are subject to the quarterly Part 139 inspections, which includes Alaska Seaplanes, Coastal Fuel Inc, Ward Air, and Airlift Northwest.

The airport conducts quarterly fuel farm inspections, which are conducted by qualified members of the ARFF team. A spot check of the most recent round of inspections of all fuelers were conducted during this survey. One copy of the completed checklist is given to the fueler, who must report back to confirm corrective actions taken for discrepancies discovered; one copy is provided to the airport, and the other is held by ARFF as part of the Part 139 recordkeeping requirement. ARFF follows up on "open" reports with discrepancies until the fueler confirms corrective actions have been taken and ARFF verifies compliance. Closed quarterly inspection reports are then filed and retained.

There is a new member of Capital City Fire & Rescue (CCFR) with oversight of the ARFF operations. Mr. Brandon Bagwell was hired as the ARFF Programs Manager. His role will include oversight of quarterly fuel inspections and general compliance with the National Fire Protection Association standard for Handling and Storing of Hazardous Substances and Materials (NFPA 407 Aircraft Fuel Servicing). He requested and participated in a follow up visit to the fuel farm and float pond fueling operations on day 2 so that specific concerns could be pointed out and discussed. It was agreed that the prior Chubb recommendations outlining changes in placarding and placing of emergency fuel shut off stations were needed to reduce the risk of loss.

The FAA has adopted the guidance in in NFPA 407 that automatic overfill controls should be installed on fuel supply tanks. Unfortunately most of the JNU airfield fuel operators with mobile fueler supply tanks have refused to install overfill protection systems. Aero Services is the only aircraft fuel operator outfitted with overfill protection systems.



6.2.11 Loading and Unloading.

6.2.11.1 Aircraft fuel servicing tank vehicles shall be loaded only at an approved loading rack.

6.2.11.2 Aircraft fuel servicing tank vehicles shall not be loaded from a hydrant pit, unless permitted by the authority having jurisdiction under emergency circumstances.

6.2.11.3 Filling of the vehicle cargo tank shall be under the observation and control of a qualified and authorized operator at all times.

6.2.11.4 The required deadman and automatic overfill controls shall be in normal operating condition during the filling operation.

6.2.11.5 The controls shall not be blocked open or otherwise bypassed.

6.2.11.6 The engine of the tank vehicle shall be shut off before starting to fill the tank.

NFPA 407

2017 Edition

Excerpt from NFPA 407 pertaining to overfill protection systems

The Juneau Fire Marshall, the authority having jurisdiction, has failed to enforce the FAA mandate, so this remains an open topic. Mr. Bagwell has promised to work with the Fire Marshall to require overfill protection be installed on all appliable tanks at the airport. Chubb has previously recommended that overfill protection should be installed to mitigate airport liability and will continue to be advocate the installation of overfill protection systems.

During this survey, most of the same concerns identified for the airfield fueling operations from the 2022 and 2023 surveys remain unresolved. Consequently, those recommendations will be resubmitted as part of this survey.

Main Fuel Farm:

Google aerial image of the JNU fuel farm

One deficiency identified at the fuel farm for Aero Services and Ward Air, plus at the Alaska Seaplanes supply tank on the airfield was the location of the emergency fuel shut-off station.

The applicable section from NFPA 407 relating to the placement of emergency fuel shut-off systems reads as follows:



407-14 AIRCRAFT FUEL SERVICING

5.1.9.2 The emergency fuel shutoff system shall shut down the flow of fuel in the entire system or in sections of the system.

5.1.9.3 The emergency fuel shutoff system shall be of a fail-safe design.

5.1.9.4* The method of fuel transfer (gravity, pumping, or use of hydraulic or inert gas pressure) shall be considered in the design of the emergency fuel shutoff system and the location of the emergency fuel shutoff valve.

5.1.9.5 The emergency fuel shutoff system shall include shut-off stations located outside of probable spill areas and near the route that normally is used to leave the spill area or to reach the fire extinguishers provided for the protection of the area.

5.1.9.6* At least one emergency shutoff control station shall be accessible to each fueling vehicle loading position or aircraft fueling position.

5.1.9.7 The emergency fuel shutoff system shall be designed so that operation of a station shuts off fuel flow to all hydrants that have a common exposure.

5.1.9.8 Emergency fuel shutoff systems shall be designed so that they shut off the flow of fuel if the operating power fails.

5.1.9.9 Emergency fuel shutoffs shall not be located beneath piping, pumps, vents, or other components containing fuel or fuel vapors.

5.1.12.4 New and existing loading systems shall comply with 5.1.12.1 through 5.1.12.3 within 5 years of the effective date of this edition.

5.1.13 Fuel Servicing Hydrants, Pits, and Cabinets.

5.1.13.1 Fueling hydrants and fueling pits that are recessed below a ramp or apron surface and are subject to vehicle or aircraft traffic shall be fitted with a cover designed to sustain the load of vehicles or aircraft that taxi over all or part of them.

5.1.13.2 Fueling hydrants, cabinets, and pits shall be located at least 15.2 m (50 ft) from any terminal building, hangar, service building, or enclosed passenger concourse (other than loading bridges).

5.2 Operations.

5.2.1* Security. Access to fuel storage and fuel vehicle loading areas shall be secured.

5.2.2 Personnel. (Reserved)

5.2.3 Prevention and Control of Spills. (Reserved)

5.2.4 Emergency Fuel Shutoff. (Reserved)

5.2.5 Bonding. (Reserved)

5.2.6 Control of Fuel Flow. If a wireless deadman control is used, the operator shall be located at the fueling point during

NFPA 407 section relating to emergency fuel shut-off placement

<u>Aero Services</u>
Aero Services maintains two Jet A fuel tanks that dispense from a single filling station. It is outfitted with safety controls including a Scully overfill protection system, deadman control, and a retractable reel bonding cable. It lacks vehicle impact protection, a safety feature identified by Mr. Bagwell, which was not previously noted during prior surveys. The recommendation will be amended to include installation of impact bollards.

The method of quickly shutting off accidental fuel spillage continues to need improvement. As reported from the 2022 and 2023 surveys, the posted signs ineffectively indicate the location of the emergency shut-off valve. To further confuse the situation, there is a remote emergency fuel shut-off station across the gravel lot that is also labeled as an emergency fuel shut-off area. There are three buttons whose specific purpose is not stated on the posted placards.

In the event of an active fuel spill, it is not clear what buttons should be activated, which continues to be an open question with the ARFF inspectors, who are not entirely sure either. Everybody agreed the logical protocol would be to depress all three buttons, but it was agreed the entire layout is flawed and in need of revision.

The prevailing opinion from the airport and CCFR/ARFF participants is that the **remote** emergency fuel shut-off station should be the primary means of shutting down the flow of fuel since it is clearly not within the probable spill area. If this is the final decision, then the instructional placards at the fuel station should be removed to avoid confusion as to where the actual emergency shut-off mechanism is located. A placard should be installed that reads "Emergency **Fuel** Shut-Off". The word "Fuel" should be added to the new placard.

The prior recommendation will be resubmitted with the addition of installing impact bollards at the filling station.

Aero Service fueling station with two Jet A tanks, which lacks vehicle impact protection to the fuel control station (right)

Aero Services fueling station with confusing and inaccurate placarding

Remote emergency fuel shut-off station with multiple push buttons without explanation


Side profile of the Aero Services fuel station line of sight from the emergency shut-off station

Ward Air

Ward Air maintains one Av Gas fuel tank at the main fuel farm. Similar to the Aero Services fueling station, there were multiple improvements recommended during the 2022 and 2023 surveys that remain unresolved. This includes repairing the broken bonding cable clip and relocating the emergency fuel shut off station away from the probable fuel spill area. It would make sense to move the emergency fuel shut-off station to the remote panel across from the Aero Services fuel station, possibly to make it a universal emergency fuel shut-off for both Aero Services and Ward Air. This will be a decision for Mr. Bagwell and the Fire Marshal.

The prior recommendation will be resubmitted.

Ward Air fuel farm Av Gas tank

Ward Air mobile fueler filling station (left) and emergency fuel shut-off valve within the probable spill zone

Ward Air Bonding cable clip does not close, the exact condition observed in 2022 and 2023

Ward Air supply tank intake for filling, no deadman or overfill controls

Airfield Fuel Supply Tanks

Airfield fueling tank locations

Ward Air

Ward Air is an on-demand sea plane service. Their main office and one Av Gas fuel tank is located on the airfield to the east of the terminal. The fuel tank is protected with impact bollards, deadman control, bonding cable but is not equipped with an overfill protection system. A recommendation will be submitted to install an overfill protection system.

As recommended in 2023, the placard for the emergency fuel shut off valve at their main office is faded and should be replaced.

Ward Air airfield Av Gas tank near their office

Ward Air emergency shut off valve is located outside of the "probable spill area", but the placard is faded and should be replaced

The fuel tank filling equipment contains safety features include bonding cable and deadman control

Alaska Seaplanes

Alaska Seaplanes and Coastal Helicopters are separate operations, but both offer on-demand air travel focused on partnerships with the tourist cruise ship lines that travel to Juneau and other ports in Alaska. Coastal provides helicopter tours over the nearby Mendenhall Glacier and other wilderness sites. Both flying services generate revenues from reservations generated from the tourism industry and including for visitors who travel to Juneau by private or commercial aircraft.

New in 2024, Alaska Seaplanes completed construction of their new building, which is a two story extension to the north end of the terminal. Their Jet A fuel tank used to supply their mobile fuelers was relocated from its prior location next to the Coastal Fuel tank to a new location on the ramp just behind their building. Their mobile fuelers are now parked on the ramp adjacent to the tank.

New Alaska Seaplanes facility

Alaska Seaplanes newly relocated Jet A fuel tank for supplying mobile fuelers

The fuel tank is properly protected with impact bollards, but otherwise is missing several import safety features. It is recommended that the following missing safety features be installed: bonding cable, deadman control, emergency fuel shut-off, and overfill protection.

Coastal Fuel Inc

Coastal Fuel Inc supplies fuel to Coastal Helicopters fleet of aircraft. The fuel tank is protected with impact bollards. There is an emergency fuel shut off valve placed outside of the probable spill area on a small yellow hut to the north of the tank. It is recommended that the following missing safety features be installed: bonding cable, deadman control, and overfill protection.

Coastal Fuel Jet A fuel tank, highly visible placards, but no bonding cable, deadman control, or overfill protection system

Coastal fuel tank and yellow service hut with the emergency fuel shut-off button

Coastal fuel tank and yellow hut with the emergency fuel shut-off station

<u>Airlift Northwest</u>

Airlift Northwest is the medical flight carrier for Juneau and operates one Jet A fuel tank next to their hangar on the airfield. The tank has highly visible warning placards posted on the tank. The emergency fuel shut off valve is y installed on the nearby hangar outside of the “probable spill area”. It is recommended that a new emergency fuel shut-off placard should be installed at the proper height of seven feet above the ground as per guidance in NFPA 407.

Airlift Northwest Jet A fuel tank (left) and operator's station (right)

5.1.11 Marking and Labeling.

5.1.11.1 Emergency fuel shutoff signs shall be located at least 2.1 m (7 ft) above grade, measured to the bottom of the placard.

5.1.11.2 Emergency fuel shutoff signs shall be positioned so that they can be seen readily from a distance of at least 15.2 m (50 ft).

Emergency fuel shut-off station on the wall of the hangar with faded sign (left) and NFPA 407 section on placarding (right)

Airport Mobile Fuelers:

Aero Services Mobile Fuelers

Aero Services is the primary commercial aircraft fueling FBO at the airport. Their main office is located on the airfield where their mobile fuel trucks are parked. The mobile fuelers were parked at sufficient distances from structures and each other vehicles. Visual observation of the mobile fueler systems indicated that they had bonding cables and functioning deadman controls. Overall equipment condition was good.


Aero Service Jet A mobile fueler parked on the ramp, properly chocked wheels, placards with good visibility, deadman control (orange cable), and bonding cable on reel

The Jet A mobile fuel truck is outfitted with overfill protection connections, the Jet A placard is partially obstructed (right)

Alaska Seaplanes Mobile Fuelers

The Alaska Seaplanes mobile fuelers were parked at sufficient distances from structures and each other vehicles. Visual observation of the mobile fueler systems indicated that they had bonding cables and functioning deadman controls. Some placards observed to be faded and in need of replacement.

Faded placards “Flammable” & “No Smoking” which is also partially obstructed by the ladder



Emergency fuel shut-off button, fire extinguisher, and bonding cable

<u>Alaska Seaplanes Float Pond Based Mobile Fueler Trailer</u>

Alaska Seaplanes operates one mobile fuel trailer, which is parked on North Float Plane Access Road. The trailer wheels are chocked and NFPA 407 placarding is posted. The bonding cable reel is located on the trailer, so the fueling operator will need to hold the cable grip, walk along the shore and down the dock ramp and clip to the aircraft. As reported in prior years, there is skepticism as to whether the bonding cable is actually used during fueling. New this year was the observation that the cable was clipped to a ground post, which serves no purpose whatsoever.

Alaska Seaplanes fueling trailer parked on North Float Pond Road

The bonding cable was clipped to a ground post

The ARFF Programs Manager participated in a tour the float pond fueling operations. He did not understand the bonding cable configuration and generally not comfortable with the permanently uncoiled fuel hose sitting on the dock. He will address CCFR concerns along with our resubmitted recommendation with Alaska Seaplanes.

Alaska Seaplanes float pond fueling dock

Coastal Fuel Mobile Fuel Trucks

The mobile fuelers were outfitted with functioning bonding cables and deadman controls. Placards were generally in good condition, although one of the "No Smoking" signs was partially obstructed, so it would be better to move that placard to the bumper.

Coastal mobile fueler outfitted with bonding cable, chocked wheels, and emergency fuel shut-off

Rear placards (partially obstructed No Smoking placard)

Another Jet A mobile fueler

Overall Fueling Summary

During the next round of Part 139 quarterly fueling inspections, it is suggested that Mr. Bagwell participate in the overall process and work with the various fueling companies for resolution of all recommended improvements.

Emphasis should be placed on the following topics so that all of the recommendations be addressed:

1. Fuel Farm emergency fuel shut-off controls, proper placarding, and vehicle impact protection.
2. Float pond fueling safety controls.
3. Mobile fueler placarding, to include replacement of all faded decals and any that are partially obstructed by ladders on the exterior of the tanks.
4. Address the lack of overfill protection systems for Ward Air, Coastal Fuel, and Alaska Seaplanes supply tanks for mobile fuelers. This will require a decision from the Fire Marshall, the authority having jurisdiction, for universal enforcement of the NFPA 407 guidance.

One final observation and suggestion is to have the various fueling operators protect fuel hoses from wear and tear by installing protective spiral wrapping on fuel hoses that are not mounted on supports or reels. This would apply to fuel tanks mounted on concrete pads operated by Ward Air, Alaska Seaplanes, and Coastal Fuel.

Example of a hose protected in plastic spiral wrap to mitigate degradation from surface abrasion

Snow Removal Equipment (SRE)

The airport owns and operates:

- three MB3 multi-function machines,
- two tractors with front displacement plow blades,

- two multi-use tractors with front-end mountable devices (typically buckets for loading snow into dump trucks),
- two rotary snow blower machines,
- one truck with a front-mounted broom that is sometimes used during other seasons for movement area FOD removal, and
- one tanker truck for applying de-icing chemical to movement areas.

The dump trucks and tractors are used across all seasons for various airfield projects as needed. All equipment is garaged inside the climate controlled airport snow removal and maintenance building.



Maintenance & SRE shop interior

Maintenance & SRE shop equipment wash bay

Multi-function machines (3) with plow blade, broom, and blower, the same for all three machines





Rotary snow blowers (2)

Deicing truck and broom truck

Mr. Andres Delgado is the airport Snow Boss. While the Snow Boss is the primary contact with the ATCT while movement area is being maintained, it is common that a lead equipment operator may also initiate communications directly with the ATCT. SRE are operated by airport staff and no hired contractors are brought in to run airport machinery.

For runway conditions assessment, the airport uses a Bowmonk AFM2 Mark 3 decelerometer.

De-icing agent for movement areas and sand for landside applications is stored in the sand and chemical accommodation building (SCAB) which is divided into half sections with separate large roll-up doors on the front and back.

SCAB building

Sand stored on one side of the building

De-icing chemical storage on other side of the building

Airfield Lighting Electrical Vault

The are two airfield lighting electrical vaults. The primary vault continues to be the older one of the two, which is a freestanding building on apron east of the ARFF station. The newer vault located in the SRE building will be the reserve facility for now. Both vaults were observed to be well maintained with good housekeeping and no accumulation of combustibles. Both have newly installed "Danger - High Voltage" warning signs posted on all exterior doors.

The older vault remains as the primary airfield lighting vault (left) and door to new backup vault in the Maintenance & SRE shop (right)



New electrical warning placards used on all lighting vault doors

The regulators in both vaults have placards identifying the circuit numbers under their control, however the actual names of the lighting or signs powered by the regulators are not identified, such as Runway 8/26 or Taxiway A. It is recommended that more descriptive placards be mounted on each regulator, to include clearly stated descriptions of the exact circuits controlled.

It is strongly suggested that printed diagrams showing the geographic locations on the airfield of the circuits controlled be installed at or near each regulator. Examples are provided in images below. The objective is to the reduce risk on injuries to staff or hired electricians by making it abundantly clear which electrical circuits need to be de-energized prior to accessing the wiring on the airfield.

Older vault regulator and main panel with nondescriptive labeling (e.g. CCR-1) where more plain language and corresponding airfield reference diagrams will improve awareness of proper circuits to de-energize

Newer vault regulators with circuit names (CCR 5, CCR 6, etc) on black placards, but with no other references



Example of better regular placarding reference diagramming for an airfield lighting regulator

When any airfield lighting system repairs are conducted there is a mandatory lockout-tagout (LOTO) process that involves:

1. De-energizing the lighting regulators by powering-off on the front panel knob.
2. Locking-out the circuit breaker in the main panel with a padlock and tag.



Regulator de-energizing involves turning the knob to "off" and then installing a padlock to the circuit breaker

Older vault electrical work being conducted (not a lighting regulator) that was properly locked out

It is also recommended that the LOTO written program be printed and posted on the wall inside both airfield lighting electrical vault.



An example of a LOTO policy posted in a vault with a clipboard log of activity

Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF)/Emergency Preparedness

The ARFF operations are contracted with the Capital City Fire & Rescue (CCFR) who maintains a staff of 40 firefighters at the fire station that lies partly within the fenced area of the airfield. It is staffed 24/7/365 for responses on and off the airport, with a minimum of two firefighters on duty. All staff are cross trained for ARFF duty. The ARFF Fire Department meets an Index C capability. There are three ARFF rescue trucks.

The fire station building space is roughly allocated 50/50 between ARFF and CCFR assets. The north end which is outside of the airport fence line is occupied by the CBJ FD trucks and equipment. The south end is occupied by the ARFF which is located inside the airport fence line. The center area contains the living areas, locker room, kitchen, and other meeting areas used by the firefighters.

ARFF station

ARFF rescue trucks

Third ARFF rescue truck on loan from Palmer FD

The airport emergency plan is reviewed annually for consideration of revisions. The most recent triennial full-scale exercise was just conducted on July 23, 2022. The ARFF staff participates in annual live fire training at several different training centers throughout the year, typically in groups of two to four each session so that station coverage is maintained at all times. The most recent live fire training was conducted in September 2024.

Airport Security:

Mr. Paul Khera is the new Airport Security Coordinator (ASC). Otherwise there have been no significant changes at the airport security operations since our last visit. The ASC is also responsible for badging the airport tenants and monitoring the approximately 70 cameras located around the terminal, ramp, and parking lot. Videos are retained on a server and recordings are on a 45-day loop.

Security at JNU is provided exclusively by Juneau Police Department (JPD) who provides an on-duty officer onsite 24/7/365. The airport has an agreement with CBJ that no LEO will vacate the airport unless they have TSA approval. It was discussed that the airport security may be vulnerable during some sort of catastrophic event away from the airport where LEO's may be called to respond, leaving the airport without a security presence, but JPD has vowed to maintain at least one LEO onsite.

The terminal public access doors are unlocked 24/7/365. There are approximately 100 closed circuit cameras in use, located both inside and outside of the terminal. Consequently, the vast majority of the terminal and immediate external public areas are under continuous surveillance, except inside restrooms.

The airfield is partially fenced with the majority of the tidal flats at the east end of the airport unfenced. There are also segments along the south boundary at the west end of the airfield that are unfenced due to accessibility constraints.

Airfield operations personnel regularly inspect the perimeter of the airfield to verify that all access gates are locked. During the airfield perimeter ride, all access gates observed were noted to be sturdy and locked shut.

<u>Homeless Encampment on Airport Property</u>

There is an ongoing homeless persons encampment located on airport property, north of the airport across the street from the airport parking lots. For this reason, a recommendation was submitted last year to partner with the CBJ and the City of Juneau to increase the presence of law enforcement at the airport until the encampments are removed. Criminal incidents continue to occur involving homeless individuals interacting with airport patrons in the parking lot and observed car-prowls observed on security cameras. The topic was discussed in great detail during the introductory meeting for this survey.

While the airport and CBJ Risk Management Department continue to seek support from the City of Juneau Mayor and the City of Juneau municipal governing body, there is extreme reluctance to remove homeless people due to potential civil rights violations.

There are several security factors that directly impact airport operations, including the welfare of airport patrons, but also the potential for wildfires originating in the wooded areas and the trash that may attract wildlife that may find its way onto the aircraft movement areas. During this year's meeting the USDA wildlife biologist, Mr. Miksell, indicated that the presence of trash and debris from the encampment is causing a noticeable increase in wildlife activity both on and off the airfield.

Given the known issues impacting airport operations, it continues to be recommended that immediate actions be taken to mitigate the risk of negatively impacting airport operations. This may include any combination of total removal of the unlawful camping and/or increasing law enforcement presence in this landside areas of the airport, in addition to the existing presence of LEO's in the terminal.

The red line indicates land owned by airport north of Yandukin Dive, several homeless camps are within the wooded sections

The prior recommendation will be resubmitted to state for the record the legal liability exposures directly impacting airport patrons, workers, and other visitors arising from the continuing uncontrolled criminal activity to the north of the airport parking lot.

Wildlife Hazard Management Plan (WHMP):

The current WHMP was written and approved by the FAA in January 2022. Mr. Miksell, the local USDA Wildlife Biologist attended the survey introduction meeting. He conducts the annual WHMP review and is stationed locally, so he frequently partners with airport personnel to manage wildlife exposures on the airfield.

The surrounding geography of the airport supports a variety of wildlife habitats established in forests, tidal flats, rivers, streams, and wetlands. The east side of the airport property that is not fenced is particularly vulnerable to wildlife activities. River flow and tides may deposit tree debris, man-made objects, or dead animal carcasses that naturally attract wildlife. On occasion this debris is removed for the specific purpose of reducing wildlife activity within the airspace of the airport. For example, large tree stumps provide convenient perches for flocks of birds, so some larger stumps have been removed to reduce the congregation of birds. A larger dead animal carcass will also attract multiple groups of scavengers, so those are removed.

A copy of the FAA bird strike tracking log was reviewed prior to this survey. There were seven reported incidents in 2023 and only two in 2024 YTD. Species of birds included pine siskin, bald eagle, spotted sandpiper, snow bunting, and semipalmated plover. One of the strikes in 2023 involved an eagle that was reported on the log as causing damage to the aircraft.

All airfield operations and maintenance staff are trained on how to haze wildlife. Airport vehicles carry approved hazing devices.

Float Pond:

The float pond operates as Runway 8W/26W and is maintained by the airport. All flights using 8W/26W occur during daylight hours only. The standard water depth is maintained at 16’ to 17.5’. There are two control valves at the west end of the pond where water is either drained to or drawn in from the Mendenhall River.

West end facing east from South Float Plane Road, commercial float planes (left) and private aircraft (right)

The pond was last dredged in 2009 or 2010 where excavated materials were used for backfilling at project sites on the airport property. When pond maintenance is needed, the depth is reduced to around 14' which still allows aircraft to safely operate.

The Float Plane Access Road runs the circumference of pond. The two segments of the road are referred to as the North Float Pond Road and South Float Pond Road.



Float Plane Access Road

Most of the float docks along the north shore of the pond are leased to commercial aviation companies. The rest of the docks along the south shore are mixed between commercial and private aircraft owners.

The airport is responsible for the upkeep of the concrete pad, ramp, and the plastic landing float. The aircraft owner "tenant" is responsible for acquiring and installing the floating dock where the aircraft is moored. The airport has authority to condemn private docks if they are observed to be unsafe, but every effort will be made to work with the dock owners to make repairs before any extreme actions are taken.

Components of a leased float pond dock

For maintenance and upkeep of the pond, the airport owns and uses a small boat for inspections and maintenance work. As a matter of practice, there is a comprehensive inspection of airport-controlled infrastructure on the float pond in the springtime that includes a detailed inspection of docks, pilings, ramps, and associated connections. The airfield Part 139 daily inspection checklist contains a line item for documenting float pond deficiencies, so there is a twice-daily inspection of the pond. Another ongoing preventative maintenance activity is the mowing underwater weeds using a specially design self-propelled pond maintenance machine.

Self-propelled pond maintenance machine

Tenant Hangars:
The airport provides ground leases only, so tenant hangars are built and owned by tenants. The airport has painted a centerline in one area of the east apron tenant hangar area where aircraft are free to enter from either end.

In other rows of tenant hangars, the airport has considered painting centerlines, but has decided against it because it will necessitate additional signage indicating preferred direction of use and/or dead-ends, which is predicted to create more pilot confusion. No tenant hangar owners have requested that the airport add centerlines.

Aerial images of the tenant hangars on the west apron (left) and east apron (right)


West apron airfield tenant hangars, no center lead-in lines

East apron airfield tenant hangars, centerline installed in this aisle

Airfield Hosted Events:

The airport has not hosted airfield events in recent times. There are tentative plans for the Alaska Army National Guard to host a static display on the west apron in April 2025. There will be barricaded area and security enforcement will be used to manage visitors who are permitted to enter inside the perimeter security fence. As we discussed, the airport should notify your aviation broker prior to future events to verify all necessary insurance coverages are in place for the planned activities.

TERMINAL ACTIVITIES AND CONTROLS

Terminal Interior-Non-Secured Areas

The footprint of the terminal has been expanded in recent years with two recent additions to the north end of the terminal. The most recent is a new building constructed by Alaska Seaplanes which will be occupied exclusively by Alaska Seaplanes upon completion. Although this is not technically part of the public terminal, it will increase the general traffic at the north end of the terminal itself, including the sidewalks, the drive lane, and pedestrians accessing the airport parking lots.

The new Alaska Seaplanes building

The Flying Squirrel food stand inside the Alaska Seaplanes addition

The first floor of the terminal is level with the airport drive lane. The non-secured side includes airline ticketing, rental car counters, a small gift shop, general seating, utility closets, and the baggage claim carousel. There are minimal secured areas on the first floor, mainly occupied for baggage handling and airline ground operations offices.

Center entrance, main vestibule, from the drive lane



Alaska Airline ticket counter, just inside center entrance

The terminal was observed to be in good condition with excellent housekeeping. Good illumination is provided. The four terminal drive lane access vestibules have in-ground floor mats to collect moisture and debris.

All vestibules have in-ground walk-off mats, flush with the tile surface with no exposed edges

North end of terminal, Alaska Seaplanes ticketing, and non-secured general seating

First floor public restrooms and elevator landing



Rental car service counters

The second floor of the terminal is divided equally between secured and non-secured areas. The non-sterile areas include airport administration offices, a small restaurant, more general seating, and the secured access doors to the ATCT.

Second floor at north end, airport management offices (left)

Second floor non-secured general seating



Second floor non-secured public restaurant (left) and hallway to the ATCT access elevator

Second floor and elevator landing

The second level of the terminal is accessed via two escalators at the north and east ends, open staircases next to each escalator, or by one bank of elevators at the center of the terminal. Both escalators have posted placards instructing riders to hold the handrail and supervise children. It is being recommended that signs be posted in the vicinity of both escalators with directions to the elevators. These signs will provide an alternative option for patrons with mobility challenges, excessive luggage, and/or with children that might help prevent an accident. The re-direction signs away from malfunctioning escalators will also reduce confusion, also mitigating potential accidents.

North end up escalator and stairs, lacks a sign for redirecting to the elevators

All escalators have warning placards, for adults to supervise children and to hold on to handrails



North end escalator upper discharge



East end down escalator



East end stairs running parallel to the downward escalator

Walk off mats were installed below the drinking water fountains as recommended in prior surveys. It is being recommended that the mats be repositioned slightly further away from the wall, so that any water drips will be collected as persons are walking away from the water fountain or bottle filling station. The custodians should be alerted to regularly inspect the condition of the mats. Mats should remain flat on the floor and that none of the edges are rolled or folded over which would result in a trip hazard. For those mats in high foot traffic corridors, there should be a plan to replace them on a regular basis, including a stock of replacement mats.

Non-secured area drinking water fountain (left) and secured area (right) with bottle filling station with newly installed walk off mats (which should be pulled further away from the wall to catch spills/drips)

Cleaning inside the terminal is performed by employee custodians who are on duty 20 hours per day. They are performing continuous cleaning rounds throughout the day. The custodial staff turnover is low. As recommended last year, refresher training was provided to the staff with emphasis on mitigating slip/trip and fall incidents.

General life safety features present in the terminal include emergency lighting, exit placard, automatic fire sprinklers, and a formalized emergency action plan. Exit signs and emergency lighting is placed throughout the terminal with backup power provided by a diesel backup generator.

The terminal is equipped with automatic external defibrillator (AED) devices and portable fire extinguishers. It was not evident from the cabinets when the last equipment and inspection took place. AED devices should be inspected and maintained in accordance with manufacturer specifications. Some features, such as the electrodes that are attached to the skin have a limited useful product life and should be replaced. It is recommended that a qualified vendor inspect all AED equipment present in the terminal and update all contents in accordance with original factory specifications.

AED cabinets located throughout the terminal, no label indicating date of last service

Baggage Carousel:
There is one baggage claim belt. As recommended from prior surveys, warning placards were installed on a prominent post and at the leading bend in the carousel near the rental car service counters. It was discussed that larger and more prominent signs would be more effective. Similarly, new emergency shut-off placards were installed close to the floor surface, but those too could be larger for better visual recognition. It continues to be recommended that "No Trespass" signs should be posted on the wall where the baggage belt transitions to the rear baggage inspection area. Sample wording is provided in images provided below.





Baggage claim belt

New warning baggage belt warning placards and emergency shut-off sign



Larger and more visually prominent baggage belt placards

Sample no trespass warning sign for baggage conveyor

TSA Gate, Passenger Boarding, and Other Secured Areas:

The secured areas of the terminal include TSA passenger screening, ticketed passenger seating, a restaurant, and aircraft boarding jetbridges. The TSA checkpoint area includes two screening lines. The arriving passengers exit through two automatic one-way gates into the non-secured side of the terminal.

TSA entry point on the 2nd Floor

Arriving passengers discharge through automatic exit gates

Jetbridges:
The airport owns and maintains jetbridges at Gates 2 and 5, plus the fixed section of Gate 4 which connects the departure lounge to jetbridge for Gate 4. Alaska Airlines owns and maintains the jetbridges at Gates 3 and 4. Gate 2A is an enclosed staircase where passengers are routed down to the ramp for mobile passenger bridge boarding.

The Gate 5 jetbridge was replaced this year with all new equipment. It is recommended that additional warning signs be installed, identical to what is installed in Gate 2, including floor markings of uneven edge surfaces and an overhead sign indicating “Caution - Uneven Surfaces”.

Gate 2 jetbridge overhead warning sign, which should be replicated for the new Gate 5 jetbridge



Gate 2 Jetbridge floor warning labels

New Gate 5 Jetbridge needs overhead and edge markings for uneven surfaces

The airport-owned jetbridges are inspected periodically by airport maintenance staff, but there is no formal documentation captured. The airport has hired a qualified contractor to perform annual jetbridge inspections and that includes periodic service work. It continues to be recommended that airport maintenance staff complete documented inspections at quarterly or semi-annual intervals.

Wheelchairs In the Terminal:

Some, but not all, airlines own and maintain wheelchairs for use by their ticketed passengers. During this survey, the idle wheelchairs were corralled and under the supervision of airline personnel, either near the front ticket counters or at boarding gate check stands. Injuries occurring from the negligent operation or from malfunctioning wheelchairs is a legal liability exposure for both the airlines who own and maintain the wheelchairs, but also the airport. It is being recommended that the airport review the programs and practices of the airlines to make sure they have robust and proactive wheelchair management practices.

Secured wheelchairs near the Alaska Airlines ticket counter

HVAC & Automatic Sprinkler Valves

The second floor HVAC and telecommunications mechanical rooms were observed to be organized and with good housekeeping. No excessive storage of combustible materials was observed.

Terminal mechanical equipment

In terms of Life Safety, the terminal is protected by automatic fire sprinkler system which is inspected annually by a qualified contractor in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA-25) guidelines.

Fire sprinkler system risers for the terminal

Diesel generator for critical electrical systems in the terminal

LANDSIDE ACTIVITIES AND CONTROLS

Terminal Exterior Walkways

The sidewalks along the terminal and including the center island leading to the parking lots are heated, which significantly reduces the risk of slip and fall in ice incidents during the wintertime. The sidewalk curbing is painted yellow for improved visibility.

Heated sidewalk near center entrance facing east

Heated sidewalk near center entrance facing north

Crosswalks to the taxi/rideshare island and parking lots

Heated sidewalk near the east terminal exit doors

One area with relatively high foot-traffic is located just outside the east exit of the terminal. This interior and exterior corridor experiences high volume from a variety of services accessed from this end of the terminal next to the baggage claim area. This includes rental car customers who are walking to or from their rental cars, cruise ship passengers walking to/from a designated bus stop is just outside the door, and to a designated smoking area next to the rental car lot. Additionally, the on-duty Juneau PD LEO often parks their CBJ patrol car in this area, so the LEO is also at-risk of slipping and falling as well.

The concrete surface outside the east terminal doors is heated, but the asphalt surfaces leading to the designated smoking area and parking lot are not heated. This area is a high emphasis snow and ice removal area and frequency checked during inclement weather. The after dark lighting in this high foot traffic area has been identified in prior surveys as having low lighting, including for the rental car parking lot. It continues to be recommended that additional lighting be installed in the external corridor along the building.

Asphalt surface at the east terminal exit and rental car parking lot continue to remain dimly illuminated, more so than these images suggest.



This image provides a slightly better view of the disparity of lighting of the area in question

Pedestrian crosswalk markings on the terminal drive lane between the exit doors and parking lots were found to be visible following re-painting after the completion of the parking lot rehab project.

Airport Parking Lot & Entry Drive:
Shell Simmons Drive is a one-way street leading to the terminal. There is one 10 mph speed limit sign posted approximately 100 feet north of the terminal and no speed bumps are other warning signs. The speed limit is also painted into all three drive lanes at the approach to the terminal. Given the heavy pedestrian foot-traffic crossing the drive lane, we discussed again this year, of the need for additional speed limit signs to be installed on the drive lane to increase driver awareness to reduce speed for the safety of all individuals crossing the drive lane to the parking lots.

Speed bumps are not favored because they make snow plowing more difficult, so additional warning signs are the preferred strategy. Any combination of more speed limit signs (preferably flashing), warning signs to "slow down", or "speed readers" will greatly increase the chance that drivers will reduce vehicle speeds and decrease the potential for vehicle-pedestrian accidents. The prior recommendation is being resubmitted this year.



Incoming drive lane to the airport

Outgoing drive lane from the airport

Airport parking is offered for a fee, one rate for short-term and a slightly reduced rate for long-term parking which is managed by Republic Parking, the hired vendor.



The center taxi/rideshare island and newly rehabbed parking lot



Good lighting in the parking lots, drive lane speed limit is marked on the surface



Lighting along the airport drive lane

Good lighting of the taxi/rideshare island and parking lot

The markings on the drive lane and parking lot were repainted following the parking lot rehab project and observed to be in good condition.

RISK TRANSFER ACTIVIIES AND CONTROLS

The handling of leased space and vendor management continues to fall under the responsibility of both the CBJ Risk Management Department and the Airport Director. The participants for the risk transfer discussion included Ms. Swick and Ms. Lopez-Campos.

It was clear the CBJ and the airport are making every effort to apply robust risk transfer controls to protect interests of the airport. This includes written contracts that stipulate stated minimum liability insurance policy limits, requirements for Certificates of Insurance (COIs) and naming the airport and the CBJ as Additional Insureds by endorsement. All written agreements with vendors and contractors used by the airport are reviewed and approved by CBJ Risk Management and the Legal Department.

Unfortunately, many of the critical current-term COIs were not available for review during this survey. The current practice is to save electronic copies upon receipt in the mail or via email, but many COIs were out of date.

Vendors and contractors are used regularly for specialized work at the airport. Contractors are vetted and there is a documentation process that takes place for problem contractors and/or individuals who have exhibited poor behavior or workmanship while working at the airport.

The Chubb resource guide of recommended policy limits was provided prior to the meeting. During this survey, details of these COIs were discussed, including discrepancies of coverage and/or policy limits as compared in the resource guide.

Certificates of Insurance (COI)

Many of the COIs tracked by CBJ involve tenants' leasing of land and/or building space. For purposes of protecting the interests of the airport and CBJ, the critical elements track for each COI include:

- Proper naming of Certificateholder name
- Current policy term
- Adequate coverage lines and liability limits
- Airport and CBJ properly named as Additional Insured by endorsement.

Based on prior COI reviews, there were several issues noted, so the prior recommendation for the following COI improvement will be resubmitted:

- **Aero Services** (FBO), provides $50M liability policy limits, but the airport or City are not named as Additional Insured, which should be requested.

- **Alaska Seaplanes** COI lists $10M Aviation Liability insurance coverage. It is recommended that you review this with your broker and request appropriate limits of liability, coverages and an Additional Insured endorsement in favor of the City and airport.
- **Ward Air** COI listed $5.5M Aviation Liability insurance coverage. It is recommended that you review this with your broker and request appropriate limits of liability and coverages, and an Additional Insured endorsement in favor of the City and airport.
- **Avis/Budget Car Rental** liability policy limits are $1M GL and $1M Commercial Auto. It is recommended that that you review these liability limits with your broker and consider requesting proof of higher liability limits.
- **National/Alamo Car Rental** liability policy limits are $5M GL and $3M Commercial Auto. It is recommended that you discuss with your broker having them increase their Commercial Auto coverage limits.

2024 RECOMMNEDATIONS

2024-01 **Certificates of Insurance (COI) – Request Higher Policy Limits and/or Additional Insured Endorsements**

(Resubmitted from 2022-14 & 2023-09)

It is recommended that your insurance broker be consulted to advise the airport on recommended insurance requirements for tenants, concessionaires, contractors, etc., including types of coverage, limits of liability, and other terms such as requiring the airport to be named as an additional insured. Consultation could include a discussion of the items identified in the recent review of the current certificates of insurance. The attached Chubb guide suggested limits could also be used when reviewing and assessing limits of liability.

- **Aero Services** (FBO), provides $50M liability policy limits, but the airport or City are not named as Additional Insured, which should be requested.
- **Alaska Seaplanes** COI lists $10M Aviation Liability insurance coverage. It is recommended that you review this with your broker and request appropriate limits of liability, coverages and an an Additional Insured endorsement in favor of the City and airport.
- **Ward Air** COI listed $5.5M Aviation Liability insurance coverage. It is recommended that you review this with your broker and request appropriate limits of liability and coverages, and an Additional Insured endorsement in favor of the City and airport.
- **Avis/Budget Car Rental** liability policy limits are $1M GL and $1M Commercial Auto. It is recommended that that you review these liability limits with your broker and consider requesting proof of higher liability limits.
- **National/Alamo Car Rental** liability policy limits are $5M GL and $3M Commercial Auto. It is recommended that you discuss with your broker having them increase their Commercial Auto coverage limits.

2024-02 **Slip-Trip-Fall Accident Mitigation – Add East Terminal Exit Exterior Lighting**

(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-02 & 2023-02)

The walking surfaces outside of the east exit of the terminal lead to the bus loading zone, rental car parking lots and the designated smoking area, are considered to be high foot traffic corridor.

It is recommended that additional lighting be installed to illuminate the area during nighttime hours. Slip, trips and fall are a major accident type at airports and sufficient illumination for walking areas helps assure that persons can better see walking surfaces at all times.

Improved lighting needed at the east exit of the terminal

2024-03 Coastal Fuel – Fuel Farm Safety Improvements

(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-07)

Coastal Fuel supplies Jet A aircraft fuel their mobile fuel trucks from one above ground tank. To reduce the risk of leaks and possible resulting fires, damage, and injuries, it is recommended that their Jet A fuel station be outfitted with overfill protection and deadman control as per NFPA 407 (Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing). There is no bonding cable, so it is highly suggested that the airport and/or the ARFF Programs Manager confirm that bonding cables from the mobile fuelers and the incoming supply trucks are connected to effectively bond and ground electrostatic energy. Otherwise bonding cable reels should be installed at the fuel station.

Coastal Fuel airfield based Jet A supply tank

2024-04 Alaska Seaplanes – Fuel Farm Improvements

(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-07)

Alaska Seaplanes Airfield Based Supply Tank

Alaska Seaplanes supplies Jet A aircraft fuel their mobile fuel trucks from one above ground tank that was recently relocated to the apron and behind their new building. To reduce the risk of fire, it is recommended that their Jet A fuel station be outfitted with overfill protection, an emergency fuel shut-off switch, and deadman control as per NFPA 407 (Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing).

There is no bonding cable, so it is suggested that the airport and/or the ARFF Programs Manager confirm that bonding cables from the mobile fuelers and the incoming supply trucks are connected to effectively bond and ground electrostatic energy. Otherwise a bonding cable reel should be installed at the fuel station.

Alaska Seaplanes newly relocated Jet A fuel supply tank on the airfield

Alaska Seaplanes Float Pond Based Av Gas Fuel Trailer

Alaska Seaplanes operates a mobile fuel trailer that is staged along North Float Pond Road for the purpose of dispensing fuel to their fleet of aircraft. The fuel supply to the trailer is provided by Aero Services.

As observed during this survey and the prior surveys in 2022 and 2023, the fuel operator has permanently uncoiled the fuel hose from the retractable reel on the trailer and hung the nozzle on a post on the dock. The bonding cable on both occasions was observed to be undeployed, which suggests that aircraft are ungrounded while fueling is conducted. This is a significant fire hazard.

To assure that bonding is conducted when fueling, it is recommended that a hardwired bonding cable be installed on the dock to allow the fuel operator to safely bond the aircraft during fueling operations without having to pull from the trailer to the aircraft. It is also recommended that the airport and/or the ARFF Programs Manager conduct periodic observations to confirm that fueling operations are in compliance with NFPA 407.

Alaska Seaplanes float pond based Av Gas fuel trailer

Alaska Seaplanes Av Gas fuel trailer bonding cable clipped to a ground post

2024-05 **Ward Air – Fuel Farm Improvements**

(Revised & Resubmitted from 2023-03)

Ward Air Airfield Based Supply Tank

Ward Air operates one Av Gas fuel tank on the apron of the airfield. The sign designating the emergency fuel shut-off button is faded and should be replaced with a new high visibility sign that is at least seven (7) feet above the ground that can be seen from at least 50 feet away as per NFPA 407.

It is recommended that these be addressed during the next round of quarterly fuel inspections and noted on the respective forms to track compliance. To help reduce the potential for leaks and risk of fire, damage, or injuries, it is further recommended that their Av Gas fuel station be outfitted with overfill protection system as per NFPA 407 (Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing).

Ward Air airfield based Av Gas supply tank (left) and faded and illegible emergency fuel shut-off sign (right)

Ward Air Float Pond Based Jet A Mobile Fueler

Ward Air stages a Jet A fuel truck along North Float Pond Road for the purpose of dispensing fuel to their fleet of aircraft.

As observed during this survey, the fuel operator has permanently uncoiled the fuel hose from the retractable reel on the fuel truck and hung the nozzle on a post on the dock. The bonding cable was observed to be undeployed, which suggests that aircraft are not properly grounded while fueling. This is a significant fire hazard.

To assure that bonding is properly conducted when fueling, it is recommended that a hardwired bonding cable be installed on the dock to allow the fuel operator to safely bond the aircraft during fueling operations without having to pull from the trailer to the aircraft. The airport and/or the ARFF Programs Manager should conduct periodic observations to confirm that fueling operations are in compliance with NFPA 407.

Ward Air float pond based Jet A mobile fuel truck

Ward Air fuel truck with undeployed bonding cable

2024-06 Airlift Northwest – Fuel Farm Improvements

(New)

The emergency fuel shut-off station is properly located away from the probable fuel spill area. The button was repainted to restore high visibility as recommended from the last survey. The placard above the emergency fuel shut-off button is now faded and would not be visible from the 50 feet, so it is recommended that it be replaced. It should also be installed seven feet above ground. Both are stipulated in NFPA 407 (Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing).

Faded placard to be replaced and installed at seven feet above ground

2024-07 **Main Fuel Farm Improvements**

(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-03 & 2023-05)

Multiple improvements at the airport fuel farms are recommended to help reduce the risk of leaks, fire, damages, and injuries. Note several items do not comply with the Fixed Tank Quarterly Inspection Checklist provided in Appendix 11B of the JNU ACM, specifically for emergency fuel shut-off switches within the probable spill area for both Aero Services and Ward Air fueling stations.

Aero Services Fuel Farm Filling Station:

- The emergency fuel shut-off valve is located next to the fuel hose connection which is within the probable spill area. According to the JNU Quarterly Fueling Inspection Checklist, the emergency fuel shut-off should be not less than 20 feet, but no further than 100 feet away from the fixed tank.
- If the **remote** emergency fuel shut-off station controls the Aero Services fueling station, it may be that this should be designated as the primary shut-off device.
- NFPA 407 (Aircraft Fueling Facilities) guidance is that the signs must be at least 7 feet above ground and be readable from a distance of at least 50 feet. The current placarding does not comply and is generally confusing.
- Emergency fuel shut-off buttons should be red in color for easy and quick recognition.
- Signage should state “Emergency Fuel Shut Off” at both fuel farms and on fuel vehicles/equipment.
- Vehicle impact bollards should be installed.

Aero Services fuel farm supply station with confusing and inaccurate placarding & no impact bollards

This should be configured to be the sole emergency fuel shut-off station for Aero Services and Ward Air fuel farm tanks (if approved by the Fire Marshal)

Ward Air Fuel Farm Filling Station

- The emergency fuel shut-off switch is located next to wall of the fuel tank. In the event of a fuel spill, an individual attempting to activate the emergency shut-off would need to walk through the probable spill area, which could potentially already be engulfed in flames.

  According to the JNU Quarterly Fueling Inspection Checklist, the emergency shut off should be not less than 20 feet, but no further than 100 feet away from the fixed tank. It is recommended that the emergency fuel shut-off station be relocated to a new location in compliance with parameters set forth in the JNU ACM.

- The bonding cable clip is stuck in the open position and should be replaced so that it can properly grip a metal surface.

- The disconnected emergency fuel shut-off apparatus located at the east end of the fuel tank should be removed to avoid confusion during an emergency, which might result in delay activation of the actual emergency fuel shut-off valve.

- An overfill protection system should be installed, the same as in place at the Aero Services fuel station.

Ward Air emergency fuel shut-off well within the probable spill area (left) and defective bonding cable clip (right)

2024-08 Mobile Fueler Placards – Replace Faded Placard and/or Relocated Obstructed Placards

(New)

There are multiple aircraft fuel suppliers on the airfield that operate mobile fuel trucks. The majority of mobile fuel trucks have newer placards that are properly mounted and free from obstruction from ladders or other equipment mounted on the exterior of the trucks.

There were exceptions observed across all fueling operators, so it is recommended that during the next cycle of quarterly fuel inspections, an emphasis be made to cite the fuel operators to replace and/or relocate placards. This can be documented on the quarterly fuel inspection checklists.

Faded & obstructed placards, Alaska Seaplanes (left) and Ward Air (right)

Good example where Aero Services installed new placards that are unobstructed

2024-09 Trip & Fall Risk Reduction Improvements - Jetbridge 5

(New)

It is recommended that all safety features currently installed in Jetbridge 2 be replicated in the newly installed jetbridge at Gate 5. This will include floor level markings along the side and installing an overhead sign warning of changes in floor surface elevation. This could help reduce the risk of trip and fall accidents from passenger entering and exiting their aircraft.

New Gate 5 Jetbridge needs edge markings for uneven surfaces

Gate 2 jetbridge overhead warning sign to be replicated for the new Gate 5 jetbridge

Gate 2 Jetbridge floor warning labels to be replicated in the new Gate 5 jetbridge

2024-10 Install Directional Signs to Elevators at Both Escalators

(New)

Injuries occurring on escalators and moving walkways may be caused by individuals who should be using an elevator instead due to a variety of reasons. Some persons with mobility challenges including balance issues, crutches, canes, or walkers should not use escalators because they are much more likely to fall and be hurt or injure other riders. Other travelers may have too many suitcases, bags, carts, or uncontrolled children, who should also use an elevator.

Both escalators have warning labels with emphasis on supervising children while riding the escalator. It is recommended to take an additional step for safety and provide clear signage directing people to the elevators. Options include placing a sign on a post next to the escalator entry point or hanging a prominent sign above the entry point.

North end up escalator with warning placards, but no directions to the elevator bank



A possible solution

Figure 4-9. Freestanding sign at escalator entrance.

Examples of freestanding caution signs

2024-11 **Improvements to Airport Operations Security Arising from the Homeless Encampments located North of Yandukin Drive**

(Resubmitted from 2022-03 & 2023-11)

The airport owns real estate outside of the airfield and across the street from the public parking lots. There are several unauthorized encampments of vagrants on airport property. Multiple incidents have been reported to Juneau PD involving criminal activities ranging from car prowls to various incidents where airport patrons in the parking lots have been threatened with verbal and physical harm from inhabitants of the homeless camps. Other potential impacts to airport operations include increased wildlife activity arising from feeding on food and trash along with the potential for wildfires from illegal cooking and campfires.

It is recommended that all unauthorized camping be permanently removed to reduce risk of the aforementioned hazards impacting airport operations.

If the unauthorized camps are unable to be removed, it is recommended that additional security patrols be conducted in the parking lots for the safety of airport patrons and their property. The additional security presence should also include ongoing inspection of the camps for proper containment of trash as well as the control of fires.

Incidents attributed to actions of the vagrants that result in property damages and/or bodily injuries to patrons and visitors to the airport, where lack of security controls by the airport may be a contributing factor, may result in allegations of negligence against the airport and could result in liability claims.

2024-12 **Airfield Lighting Electrical Vault Improvements (Primary & Backup Vaults)**

(Resubmitted from 2022-10 & 2023-03)

Install More Descriptive Placards on All Regulators

It is recommended that the placards posted on all airfield lighting electrical vault regulators be changed to use more plain language descriptions of the circuits they control. Terms like CCR, C/L, and CKT may not be understood by new workers or contractors new to the airport. It is critical that all personnel performing repairs be absolutely clear on what circuits must be de-energized before leaving the vault to begin work.

Images are provided below of much clearer wording on placards. Many airports also post circuit diagrams of the airfield that clearly mark the geographical location of the circuits, which is highly suggested to be included with the improved placarding. A failure to properly de-energize and apply effective lockout-tagout hardware could result in grave injuries to persons conducting repairs.

Primary vault regulators with circuit names (CCR 5, CCR 6, etc) on black placards, but with no other references



Example of better regular placarding reference diagramming for an airfield lighting regulator

Post the Lockout-Tagout (LOTO) Policy on the Wall of the Vault

It is recommended that the airport's written LOTO policy and associated hardware be installed on in both airfield lighting electrical vaults. This will emphasize following clear and consistent procedures, intended to prevent serious injuries or death of personnel working on the airfield lighting systems.

The older vault contains LOTO hardware, and it is recommended that a similar kit be installed in the new vault.



An example of a LOTO policy posted in a vault with a clipboard log of activity

2024-13 Install a Non-Slip Floor Mats Beneath All Drinking Fountains
(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-08 & 2023-10)

The drinking fountain in the departures lounge is located above a terrazzo floor surface along a high foot-traffic corridor, which presents a high-risk slip and fall exposure. Water may be splashed onto the floor from drinking water and including filling of water bottles.

Walk off mats have been placed beneath the fountains. It is recommended they be moved to the floor in front of the fountains so that water dripped from persons and water bottles when walking away will be captured on the mats.

It is also recommended that the floor mats be inspected and cleaned regularly and replaced if/when the edges starting rolling up or mats start slipping, which might lead to a slip or trip and fall accident.

Non-secured area drinking water fountain (left) and secured area (right) with bottle filling station with newly installed walk off mats (which should be pulled further away from the wall to catch spills/drips)

2024-14 **Enhanced Speed Limit Signs on Shell Simmons Drive Approach to the Terminal**
(Resubmitted from 2022-09 & 2023-09)

Vehicle traffic approaching the terminal presents a high-risk exposure for pedestrians crossing the drive lane. It is recommended that enhanced signage be installed to alert drivers to the posted 10 miles per hour speed limit. Options included flashing speed limit signs (often solar power devices), vehicle speed-reader signs, and additional soft/frangible signs installed between lanes.

2024-15 **Install Larger & More Prominent Warning Placards at the Baggage Carousel**
(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-07 & 2023-13)

New warning signs were installed in response to the prior recommendation. It is recommended that larger and more prominent signs be used to reduce the risk of injuries to individuals present at the baggage carousel. The warning signs should be posted and spaced appropriately along the length of the belt. Hands and feet are particularly vulnerable for individuals who may be trying to sit or play on or near the moving carousel and warnings should prohibit persons from sitting, riding or touching moving conveyors. Examples are provided of possible language used at other airports.

New warning baggage belt warning placards and emergency shut-off sign

Larger and more visually prominent baggage belt placards

It continues to be recommended that "No Trespass" signs be installed on the carousel entry and exit points on the wall to deter unauthorized access to the secured baggage make up area.

Sample no trespass warning sign for baggage conveyor

2024-16 **AED Devices in the Terminal – Inspect and Replace Expired Pads**

(Resubmitted from 2023-16)

AED devices should be inspected and maintained in accordance with manufacturer specifications. Some features, such as the electrodes that are attached to the skin have a limited useful product life and should be replaced. It is recommended that a qualified vendor inspect all AED equipment present in the terminal and update all contents in accordance with original factory specifications.

AED cabinets located throughout the terminal, no label indicating date of last service

2024-17 **Document Jetbridge Inspections**

(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-11)

Improperly maintained jetbridges can result in damage to aircraft, injuries to passengers, employees, or other individuals using these walkways. Aircraft can also be damaged by defective jetbridge machinery. Documentation of systematic inspections can be very helpful in preventing accidents and mitigating any associated airport liability. It is recommended that a monthly in-house jetbridge self-inspection program be implemented to include all inspection points outlined by the jet bridge manufacturer.

2023 RECOMMNEDATIONS

2023-01 **Re-Paint Flawed Runway Identifiers – Restore Glass Bead Reflectivity**

It was observed that some of the movement area markings were inadvertently flawed during touchup work by the hired contractor. Paint was applied over the top of glass beading, which diminished the light reflectivity of the marking. It is recommended that all runway markings be re-inspected and repaired to restore full light reflectivity.

September 2024 Update: Resolved. All impacted markings were re-painted earlier this year.

Runway 8 indicator re-painted in 2024

2023-02 Slip-Trip-Fall Accident Mitigation Program – East Terminal Exit Exterior Lighting
(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-02)
The walking surfaces outside of the east exit of the terminal lead to the bus loading zone, rental car parking lots and the designated smoking area, are considered to be high foot traffic corridor. It is recommended that additional lighting be installed to illuminate the area during nighttime hours. Slip, trips and fall are a major accident type at airports and sufficient illumination for walking areas helps assure that persons can better see walking surfaces at all times.

September 2024 Update: Partially resolved. Emphasis increased for snow removal and deicing. The recommendation will be revised to emphasize installing better lighting in the vicinity.

2023-03 Escalator Repair & Improvements
It is recommended that full-width yellow comb plates be present on both elevators at each end. The contrasting yellow color provides visual recognition to pedestrians of the interface between the moving stair tread and the fixed comb plate. This is a designed safety feature to reduce the risk of injuries for persons entering or exiting the device.

September 2024 Update: Resolved.

All escalator comb plates are now full width solid yellow

2023-04 Main Fuel Farm - Fire Prevention Improvements
(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-03)

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and is resubmitted.

Ward Air Fuel Station

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted.

2023-05 Aero Services Mobile Fuel Trucks - Fire Prevention Improvements
(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-04)

September 2024 Update: Resolved.

2023-06 Coastal Fuel & Alaska Seaplanes - Fire Prevention Improvements

Side by Side Jet A Fuel Tanks

Coastal Fuel and Alaska Seaplanes operate from the same vicinity on the airfield with one Jet A tank each, mobile fuel trucks, or a fuel trailer. To reduce the risk of fire, it is recommended that both Jet A fuel tanks be outfitted with overfill protection and bonding cables at each filling station.

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted. This fueling area was reconfigured, so the recommendation will be edited to fit the current configuration.

Coastal Mobile Fuel Trucks

Similar to Aero Services, some Coastal mobile fuel trucks were found to have faded placards that should be replaced to restore their high visibility appearance. In a few instances, placards should be placed in different locations away from obstructions such as ladders.

September 2024 Update: Mostly resolved. A new recommendation will be submitted to conduct an emphasis of all placarding on the next round of quarterly inspections.

Alaska Seaplanes Fuel Trailer

Alaska Seaplanes operates a mobile fuel trailer that is staged along North Float Pond Road for the purpose of dispensing fuel to float plane customers who moor at dock FP-23 next to the fuel trailer.

As observed during this survey and the prior survey in 2022, the fuel operator uncoiled the fuel hose from the retractable reel and hung the nozzle on a post on the dock. The bonding cable on both occasions was observed to be coiled inside the reel mounted on the trailer.

To help better assure that bonding is conducted when fueling, it is recommended that a hardwired bonding cable be installed on the dock to allow the fuel operator to safely bond the aircraft during fueling operations without having to pull from the trailer to the aircraft.

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted.

2023-07 Ward Air - Fire Prevention Improvements

Ward Air operates a fuel tank on the apron of the airfield. The sign designating the emergency fuel shut-off valve is faded and should be replaced with a new high visibility sign that is at least seven (7) feet above the ground that can be seen from at least 50 feet away as per NFPA 407. It is suggested that these be addressed during the next round of quarterly fuel inspections and noted on the respective forms to track compliance.

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted.

2023-08 Certificates of Insurance (COI) – Request Higher Policy Limits and/or Additional Insured Endorsements

(Resubmitted from 2022-14)

It is recommended that your insurance broker be consulted to advise the airport on recommended insurance requirements for tenants, concessionaires, contractors, etc., including types of coverage, limits of liability, and other terms such as requiring the airport to be named as an additional insured. Consultation could include a discussion of the items identified in the recent review of the current certificates of insurance. The attached Chubb guide suggested limits could also be used when reviewing and assessing limits of liability.

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted.

2023-09 Install a Non-Slip Floor Mats Beneath All Drinking Fountains

(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-08)

The drinking fountain in the departures lounge is located above a terrazzo floor surface along a high foot-traffic corridor, which presents a high-risk slip and fall exposure. Water may be splashed onto the floor from drinking water and including filling of water bottles.

It is recommended that a non-slip floor mat be placed below the fountain to prevent water from accumulating on the terrazzo surface. The floor mat should be inspected and cleaned regularly by the custodial staff. It should be replaced if/when the edges starting rolling up, which would be **trip** hazard.

September 2024 Update: Partially resolved. The recommendation will be revised to have the walk off mats moved in front of the drinking water fountains.

2023-10 Improvements to Airport Operations Security Arising from the Homeless Encampments located North of Yandukin Drive

(Resubmitted from 2022-05)

The airport owns real estate outside of the airfield and across the street from the public parking lots. There are several unauthorized encampments of vagrants on airport property. Multiple incidents have been reported to Juneau PD involving criminal activities ranging from car prowls to various incidents where airport patrons in the parking lots have been threatened with verbal and physical harm from inhabitants of the homeless camps. Other potential impacts to airport operations include

increased wildlife activity arising from feeding on food and trash along with the potential for wildfires from illegal cooking and campfires.

It is recommended that all unauthorized camping be permanently removed to reduce risk of the aforementioned hazards impacting airport operations.

If the unauthorized camps are unable to be removed, it is recommended that additional security patrols be conducted in the parking lots for the safety of airport patrons and their property. The additional security presence should also include ongoing inspection of the camps for proper containment of trash as well as the control of fires.

Incidents attributed to actions of the vagrants that result in property damages and/or bodily injuries to patrons and visitors to the airport, where lack of security controls by the airport may be a contributing factor, may result in allegations of negligence against the airport and could result in liability claims.

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted

2023-11 Enhanced Speed Limit Signs on Shell Simmons Drive Approach to the Terminal
(Resubmitted from 2022-09)

Vehicle traffic approaching the terminal presents a high-risk exposure for pedestrians crossing the drive lane. It is recommended that enhanced signage be installed to alert drivers to the posted 10 mph speed limit. Options included flashing speed limit signs (often solar power devices), vehicle speed-reader signs, and additional soft/frangible signs installed between lanes.

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted

2023-12 Install Warning Placards at the Baggage Carousel
(Resubmitted from 2022-07)

In an effort to reduce the risk of injuries to individuals present at the baggage carousel, it is recommended that warning signs be posted and spaced appropriately along the length of the belt. Hands and feet are particularly vulnerable for individuals who may be trying to sit or play on or near the moving carousel. Two examples are provided of possible language used at other airports.

Warning signs are also recommended at the baggage carousel entry and exit points to deter unauthorized access to the secured baggage make up area.

September 2024 Update: Partially resolved, so a revised recommendation will be resubmitted

2023-13 Airfield Lighting Electrical Vault Improvements (Primary & Backup Vaults)
(Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-10)

Install More Descriptive Placards on All Regulators

It is recommended that the placards posted on the new airfield lighting electrical vault regulators be changed to use more plain language descriptions of the circuits they control. Terms like CCR, C/L, and CKT may not be understood by new workers or contractors new to the airport. It is critical that all personnel performing repairs be absolutely clear on what circuits must be de-energized before leaving the vault to begin work.

Images are provided below of much clearer wording on placards. Many airports also post diagrams of the airfield that clearly mark the geographical location of the circuits, which is highly suggested to be included with the improved placarding. A failure to properly de-energize and apply effective lockout-tagout hardware could result in grave injuries to persons conducting repairs.

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted

Install Warning Signs to All Doors

September 2024 Update: Resolved

New placard posted on all vault doors

Post the Lockout-Tagout (LOTO) Policy next to Hardware

It is recommended that the airport's written LOTO policy and associated hardware be installed on the wall of both airfield lighting electrical vaults. This will emphasize following clear and consistent procedures, all intended to prevent serious injuries or death of personnel working on the airfield lighting systems. The older and now reserve vault already contains LOTO hardware, so a similar kit should be installed in the new vault.

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted

2023-14 Airline Owned Wheelchairs in the Terminal – Verify & Update Robust Controls and Preventative Maintenance Procedures Conducted

September 2024 Update: Resolved

2023-15 Establish a Recurring Self-Inspection Program for the Mobile Passenger Bridge (Revised & Resubmitted from 2022-12)

September 2024 Update: Resolved.

2023-16 AED Devices in the Terminal – Inspect and Replace Expired Pads

AED devices should be inspected and maintained in accordance with manufacturer specifications. Some features, such as the electrodes that are attached to the skin have a limited useful product life and should be replaced. It is recommended that a qualified vendor inspect all AED equipment present in the terminal and update all contents in accordance with original factory specifications.

September 2024 Update: Unresolved and will be resubmitted